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We examine the supply-side and demand-side determinants of global bilateral food aid shipments
between 1971 and 2008. First, we find that domestic food production in developing countries is negatively
correlated with subsequent food aid receipts, suggesting that food aid receipt is partly driven by local
food shortages.  Interestingly, food aid from some of the largest donors is the least responsive to production
shocks in recipient countries.  Second, we show that U.S. food aid is partly driven by domestic production
surpluses, whereas former colonial ties are an important determinant for European countries. Third,
amongst recipients, former colonial ties are especially important for African countries.  Finally, aid
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I. Introduction 
Food aid has been one of the most important policies for economic development 
since World War II. During its peak in 1965, food aid accounted for 22% of all aid 
given to developing countries. It is meant to alleviate hunger by feeding the local 
population. Through monetization, it is also meant to help fund projects that the 
recipient governments  deem  helpful for general economic development. The 
effectiveness of food aid has been the subject of intense debate in recent years. In 
the academic realm, existing studies that empirically estimate the impacts of food 
aid  have found mixed results. Some have found that food aid alleviates hunger 
(Levinsohn and McMillan, 2007; Quisumbing, 2003; Yamano, Alderman and 
Christiaensen, 2005), and by doing so can be an effective policy for reducing conflict 
(e.g., Bardhan, 1997). Critics have observed that food aid is not always targeted or 
delivered to the most needy. Some have even argued that it could have the 
unintended and perverse effect of making the populations in recipient countries 
worse off. For example, there are many accounts of how food aid can increase 
conflict (Knack, 2001). A companion study to this paper confirms this fear and finds 
a positive relationship between food aid on the incidence of conflict (Nunn and Qian, 
2011).  
This paper addresses the important issue of food aid by focusing  on the 
determinants (rather than the consequences) of food aid and the different patterns 
of food aid across donors and recipients. We are particularly interested in the   3 
differences for African countries as they are arguably the most reliant on food aid 
today.  
The analysis begins by first providing a statistical overview of food aid 
shipments to Africa and the rest of the developing world. Then we examine a 
number of specific determinants of annual bilateral shipments of cereal aid between 
1971 and 2008. 
We find that an important determinant of food aid is the recipient country’s 
domestic production of food in the previous years. Less food production in period t 
is correlated with increased food aid received in the next two years.  This 
relationship is much stronger for African recipients than for non-African recipients. 
In other words, food aid given to Africa appears much more responsive to recipient 
need than food aid given to the rest of the developing world.   
For each donor country, we then estimate the responsiveness of its food aid 
shipments to adverse production shocks in receiving countries. We find strong 
evidence that food aid from many of the largest cereal producing countries, which 
are also some of the largest donors – e.g., Canada, USA, India and China – is the least 
responsive to variation in recipient cereal production. 
We then turn to factors in the donor countries that affect food aid shipments.  
We focus on two donor country factors: domestic cereal production and former 
colonial ties. We show that U.S. production of cereals – wheat in particular – is an 
important determinant of food  aid flows.  If the U.S.  experiences a positive 
production shock, the amount of food aid given increases in the subsequent two   4 
years. Interestingly, the correlation between donor domestic production and aid 
flows seems unique to the United States.  
For Old World donors, we examine another potential determinant of food 
aid:  former colonial ties. We find that only African countries are more likely to 
receive more food aid from former colonial masters, where as all countries are more 
likely to receive food aid from countries that were colonized by the same colonizer. 
This is interesting because it suggests that foreign countries, especially former 
colonial masters, are a  more important source of food aid for the economies of 
African countries. The greater importance of the colonizer-colony relationship for 
food aid flows to Africa may be explained by the fact that African countries more 
recently gained independence relative to countries in Latin America and Asia. 
Our last results examine the interaction between colonial history and the 
responsiveness of donors to recipient need, as measured by recipient cereal 
production. We find that for all countries when the recipient and donor have the 
same former colonizer, food aid shipments are less responsive to recipient need. For 
African countries this is also true when the donor is the former colonizer. This 
suggests that although colonial ties increase the total amount of aid flows between 
two countries, the increased flows appear to be much less responsive to need. These 
flows are not necessarily going to the locations that need it most. This is interesting 
and suggests that food aid from former colonial masters are intended for general 
development or other objectives rather than for the alleviation of acute hunger.   5 
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, to help motivate 
our investigation of the determinants of food aid, we review the existing evidence on 
the consequences of food aid.  Section III provides a statistical overview of food aid 
flows to all developing countries. In Section IV, we focus on the determinants of food 
aid  to Africa and the rest of the world.  Finally, we offer concluding remarks in 
Section V. 
II. Consequences of Food Aid in Africa and the Rest of the World 
Before presenting our analysis on the determinants of food aid shipments to 
developing countries, we first provide a brief overview of the potential benefits and 
costs to the receiving countries. A more detailed description is provided in Nunn 
and Qian (2011). 
The most prominent problems associated with food aid can be divided into 
three categories. The first problem is one that faces all foreign aid. Food aid can be a 
significant source of revenues for some recipient countries. It is also entirely 
fungible and can be monetized and spent at the discretion of the recipient 
government. This increase in resources could increase political competition, which 
can often lead to increased conflicts within the recipient countries. 
Second, a closely related problem is that governments of poor countries often 
have little political incentive to deliver these additional resources appropriately, i.e. 
to the most needy. For example, in his study of food aid in Rwanda during the early 
1990s, Peter Uvin (1998) finds that aid was misused by the government and 
allocated to a few elites, generating  discontent and conflict. He writes: “The   6 
development enterprise directly and actively contributes to inequality and 
humiliation. The material advantages accorded to a small group of people… living in 
Rwanda contribute to greater economic inequality and the devaluation of life of the 
majority” (Uvin, 1998, p. 142). This is just one of many examples that one comes 
across in the accounts of aid workers. Another example is in Zimbabwe, where the 
government would only provide food aid to known political supporters (Thurow 
and Kilman, 2009). Or, in Somalia, were food aid was often not at all used to alleviate 
the hunger of any population. During the early 1990s, many observed food aid being 
traded for arms or stolen and then sold for money, which was pocketed by the 
government (Perlez, 1992). Or, in Rwanda during the early 1990s, where 
government stealing of food aid was so problematic that aid was canceled on several 
occasions (Uvin, 1998, p. 90). 
Finally, a commonly cited problem is that food aid increases the amount of 
cheap foods in recipient countries, and thus decreases the price of agricultural 
production and the income of farmers in those countries (Pedersen, 1996; Kirwan 
and McMillan, 2007). This not only decreases agricultural incomes but also 
increases income inequality between urban and rural workers. 
In a companion paper, Nunn and Qian (2011), we examine the effect of food 
aid on the incidence of conflict, a potential negative impact of food aid that has been 
hypothesized in the literature but never formally tested. Identifying such a causal 
mechanism is fraught with difficulties. To overcome these, we focus specifically on 
wheat aid from the United States, which constitutes the vast majority of aid given by   7 
the largest donor of aid in the world (see below). We instrument for U.S. wheat aid 
to donor countries using weather induced wheat production shocks. Our estimates 
show  that food aid causes increased civil war incidence in receiving countries. 
Although we find large effects for internal conflicts, we find no effects on inter-state 
conflict.  We find that the effects on receiving countries within Africa are not 
statistically different from other parts of the world. However, the regional estimates 
are very imprecise.  
In summary, studies on the consequences of food aid thus far provide enough 
evidence on the negative effects of food aid to warrant great concern over its 
effectiveness. To understand why food aid does not have the impact it is meant to, 
we must first understand the determinants of food aid, which is the focus of this 
study. 
III. A Statistical Overview of Food Aid to Africa and the Rest of the Developing 
World 
This section provides a descriptive overview of the pattern of global food aid 
shipments. It is important to keep a few facts in mind for the following discussion. 
First, over 90% of food aid is cereals. Therefore, food aid will be synonymous with 
cereals aid in this paper. Second, when food aid is reported, the value of food aid 
typically includes shipping costs, which can constitute more than half of the total 
value of aid (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). Since data on the itemized value of food 
aid are not available and shipping companies are typically from the rich countries, 
we will report food aid in terms of volume of food rather than dollar value. This also   8 
sidesteps some difficulties in interpretation since it is not clear how exactly food aid 
is valued.  Moreover, grain markets are thought to be segmented, and the price that 
the donor government values the food (or even the world grain price) may not 
reflect the value to the recipients of food aid.  
We begin by examining the aggregate trend in food aid shipments to Africa 
and to the rest of the world. The total volume of food aid shipped each year 
(measured in tonnes) between 1971 and 2008 is reported in Figures 1 and 2 for 
African and for non-African countries, respectively. The data are from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) FAOSTAT Database. Cereals include wheat, rice, 
barley, maize, rye, oats, millets, sorghum, buckwheat, quinoa  and other grains 
including mixed grains. Donor and recipient countries may ship and receive 
different types of cereals. Therefore, for the purposes of comparison, we often use 
this broad category of cereals rather than specific types of cereals. Where possible, 
we also consider specific cereals, such as wheat. 
There are interesting differences in the aggregate patterns between African 
and non-African recipients. For Africa as a whole, food aid has increased steadily 
from 1971 to the mid-1980s, while for the rest of the developing world, after a sharp 
fall in the early 1970s, it remained remarkably stable during this time. In the late 
1980s food aid to Africa fell noticeably, while it remained much more stable for the 
rest of the developing world. Even today, the amount of food aid shipped to African 
countries  remains  well below the levels that existed during the Cold War. 
Importantly, this decline in food aid does not correspond to a similar decline in   9 
poverty  within Africa during the period, which suggests that other factors are 
responsible for the significant decline in food aid. 
 
 
Figure 1. Total cereal aid shipped each year to African countries. 
   10 
 
Figure 2. Total cereal aid shipped each year to non-African countries. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 report the origins of food aid shipments to African and non-
African recipients. From the figures, it is clear that the vast majority of food aid is 
from the United States. Canada, Australia, and Japan are also significant suppliers of 
aid to both African and non-African countries.   11 
 
Figure 3. Total cereal aid shipped to African countries, between 1971-2008, by 
donor.   12 
 
 
Figure 4. Total cereal aid shipped to non-African countries, between 1971-
2008, by donor. 
 
 
Next, we turn to an overview of the recipient countries within Africa. The 
total amount of food aid received during our sample period by each African country 
is shown in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 shows the countries with the largest food aid 
receipts and Figure 6 shows the countries with the smallest food aid receipts. Note 
the difference in scales for the two figures.   13 
   
 
Figure 5. The largest African recipients of total cereal aid 1971-2008. 
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Figure 6. The smallest African recipients of total cereal aid 1971-2008. 
 
 
From the figures, it is clear that Egypt has been by far the largest recipient of 
food aid. It is followed by Ethiopia, Sudan, Morocco and Mozambique. The identity of 
recipient countries within Africa makes clear the fact that aid is often (or typically) 
not given to the most needy. Egypt, the largest beneficiary of food aid,  has per 
capita income that is well above the average for the rest of Africa. 
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IV. Determinants of Food Aid in Africa and the Rest of the World 
We now turn to an examination of the determinants of food aid, focusing 
both on the supply-side  (donor-specific factors) as well as on the demand-side 
(recipient-specific factors). We also consider historical  bilateral determinants of 
food aid. 
Our empirical analysis examines variation in cereal food aid shipments from 
donor countries to recipient countries every year between 1971 and 2008. Let d 
denote donor countries, r recipient countries and t years.  Further, let ln yd,r,t denote 
the natural log of the total amount of cereal aid (measured by weight) shipped from 
donor country d to receiving country r in year t. Our estimating equations take the 
following form: 
ln yd,r,t = αd + αr + αt + β1 Xd,r  + β2 Xr,t-1 + β3 Xd,t-1 + εd,r,t      (1) 
Our specification includes donor fixed effects αd, recipient fixed effects αr and time 
period fixed effects αt. The equation includes the following determinants of food aid 
shipments:  lagged  recipient production of cereals denoted Xr,t-1,  lagged  donor 
production of cereals Xd,t-1, and historical connections between donor and recipient 
countries Xd,r. In practice, when examining donor and recipient production, we will 
consider various lag structures. 
Since the dependent variable in (1) is the natural log of food aid shipments, 
countries with zero aid flows in a particular period are omitted from the sample. 
Therefore, our coefficients capture the correlation between the independent   16 
variables of interest and the amount of food aid shipped, conditional on food aid 
being shipped. In other words, our estimates capture the intensive margin only, and 
not the extensive margin. Our estimates do not provide any evidence on the 
determinants of whether donors ship any food aid to recipient countries in a 
particular year. 
Recipient country cereal production 
The first determinant we examine is food production in recipient countries. 
Since the stated purpose of most food aid is for humanitarian relief, we expect that 
food aid shipments will be greater to countries after they have a production 
shortage in their country. A priori, the expected delay between domestic production 
and food aid receipts is not clear. For example, if food aid can respond immediately, 
then we would expect a contemporaneous relationship between domestic 
production and food aid. If instead food aid responds more slowly, then we would 
expect production to affect food aid receipts with a one or two year lag.   17 
Table 1. Responsiveness of food aid to recipient production. 
 
   
We test for a contemporaneous  effect  and  one-year  and  two-year  lagged 
effects of domestic production on food. Domestic production is measured as the 
natural log of domestic production, measured in metric tons (MT). The data are 
from FAOSTAT. 
Estimates are reported in table 1. The results in column 1 show that when 
countries have lower production in a period, then food aid receipts increase that 
period and in the following period. There is also evidence of a response two years 
later, but this effect is not statistically significant. These results provide evidence 
that  food aid does respond to recipient country production shocks.  Looking at 
African and non-African recipients  separately (columns 2 and 3), we find some 
differences.  Food aid appears to respond much more strongly to the adverse   18 
production shocks of African countries relative to non-African countries. One 
explanation for this is that negative production shocks are much more likely to 
result in loss of life in Africa, where a larger proportion of the population is at or 
near subsistence consumption.  Therefore, the international community is much 
more responsive to these shocks. 
The responsiveness of food aid to domestic production provides evidence 
that a portion of food aid is indeed driven by humanitarian motives. Because both 
production and food aid are measured in logs, the estimates provide the elasticity of 
food aid with respect to recipient production. The 0.22, 0.16 and 0.09 elasticities for 
African countries in the three years following a shock are large. They suggest that 
for African countries, food aid does provide some insurance against negative 
production shocks. 
We examine how this responsiveness varies by donor country. Motivated by 
the finding in table 1 that contemporaneous  and  one-year lags of recipient 
production are important, we examine the responsiveness of food aid in period t to 
recipient production in periods t and t-1. We allow the estimated impact to differ by 
donor country. The estimation results are reported in table 2. Each row of the table 
reports the coefficient and standard error of the relationship between recipient 
cereal production and food aid shipments from a donor country. The reported 
country coefficients are ordered from the largest estimated impact to the smallest. 
The results are reported separately for all recipients, African recipients and non-
African recipients.   19 
A clear pattern emerges. First, the coefficients are negative for all countries, 
which suggest that in general, aid is more likely to go to countries soon after they 
experience adverse production shocks. Second, the results show that the food aid 
provided by large cereal producing countries like Canada, China and the United 
States respond most weakly to domestic production. A number of explanations are 
consistent with this pattern, but it is consistent with the finding in Nunn and Qian 
(2011) that food aid shipments – at least for the U.S. – are driven not only by need in 
receiving countries, but also by donor country supply considerations. We consider 
this possibility explicitly later in this study. 
Table 2. Responsiveness of food aid to recipient production, by donor. 
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Comparing the results for African and non-African aid recipients, several interesting 
patterns emerge. The overall ranking of the responsiveness of donor countries is 
broadly similar. For example, Libya is always among the most responsive and the 
USA, Canada, India and China are always among the least responsive. However, 
there are some stark differences. For example, while aid from New Zealand and 
Austria is very responsive to African-recipient production shocks (coeff = -0.38 and -
0.36), they are very unresponsive to non-African-recipient production shocks (coeff 
= -0.02 and -0.11).  
Donor-specific determinants of food aid 
One reason that may explain why for some countries aid is less responsive to 
the needs of recipient country production is that aid may also be driven by 
objectives of the donor country that are unrelated to recipient production. We 
investigate two such possible objectives. 
Donor cereal production 
First, we explore the role that production shocks in donor countries may 
play. Many of the rich donor countries implement policies that protect domestic 
agricultural prices. One way of doing this is to purchase “excess” domestic food 
production and give or sell it in far away markets where it will not affect the prices 
of domestic producers. Barrett and Maxwell (2005) discuss such policies in his book 
on food aid policy. Many of the largest food producers practice such policies.    21 
The United States has perhaps been the most persistent practitioner of such 
policies under PL 480, which was established under the Eisenhower administration 
in 1954. President Kennedy renamed it the Food for Peace Program in 1962. It is 
comprised of three aid categories: Titles I, II and III. Title I, which historically has 
been the most important component of food aid, is administered by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and provides low interest loans to developing 
and transition countries for the purchases of U.S. agricultural commodities. Title II 
aid is gifts of food from the U.S. government for meeting emergency and non-
emergency food needs. In recent years, emergency food needs have received much 
more resources than non-emergency food needs. The aid is often administered by 
NGOs. Title III provides government-to-government grants to support long-term 
growth in developing countries and makes up a very small part of PL480 food aid 
(Kodras, 1993).  
We now examine whether domestic production shocks in the donor country 
are correlated with subsequent food aid shipments. We continue to examine the 
year of the production shock and the two years that follow: t, t+1, t+2. If domestic 
production shocks affect food aid shipments, then this suggests that alternative 
factors – besides purely humanitarian considerations – also come into play when 
deciding food aid shipments.  
We begin by examining whether food aid shipments from the United States 
are affected by U.S. production shocks. This is motivated by the findings from Nunn 
and Qian (2011). Table  3  reports  these  estimates  in columns 1-3.  The unit of   22 
observation is a recipient country in a year. The estimates show that there is strong 
evidence of a positive cereal production shock increasing the supply of cereal aid 
two years later if the recipient country is African. 
 
Table 3. U.S. production and U.S. food aid. 
 
 
Columns 4-6 of the Table 3 report estimates looking specifically at wheat, 
which comprises the vast majority of U.S. food aid (Nunn and Qian, 2011). With 
wheat a similar relationship is found. A positive wheat production shock increases 
the amount of wheat aid given to African countries two years later. For wheat we 
also find an almost identical effect for non-African countries. For both, the elasticity 
is about 1.3. This suggests a very strong relationship between U.S. production and 
food aid shipments. (Note that the estimates shown here illustrate that U.S. food aid 
is driven by U.S. production, the argument from Nunn and Qian (2011). However, 
the estimates from the two studies are not directly comparable because Nunn and   23 
Qian (2011) estimates a different specification; they exploit both time variation in 
U.S. production and cross-sectional variation in the likelihood of receiving any U.S. 
food aid and having many more controls) so that they can control for country and 
year fixed effects. 
Table 4 reports the same estimates but for all other donor countries. The 
findings show that for non-U.S. donors, there is no relationship between domestic 
cereal production and cereal aid shipments. This is true whether or not the recipient 
country is African. 
 
Table 4. Production and food aid (non-U.S. donors) 
 
   24 
Taken together, the results of tables 3 and 4 provide evidence that the United 
States is the only donor that systematically determines its food aid amounts based 
on its own domestic production. 
Donor-recipient colonial ties 
We  also  investigate the role of former colonial ties. Colonial history can 
continue to matter through contemporary channels if it affects the relationship 
between two countries today. To test for this, we include in our estimating equation 
two indicator variables. The first equals one if the donor country is a former colonial 
“master” of the recipient country. An example is Britain and Ghana. The second 
equals one if the donor country and the recipient country are former colonial 
“brothers” – i.e., both are former colonies of a European country. An example would 
be the United States and Nigeria, which were both colonies of Britain.  
Estimation results are reported in table 5. As shown in column 1, colonial 
heritage matters. Food aid shipments are greater if either the donor was a former 
colonizer of the recipient or if the two countries shared a similar colonizer. 
Interestingly, the latter effect is statistically larger in magnitude than the former 
effect. 
We  find  stark differences between former colonies within and outside of 
Africa. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 show that both sets of countries are more 
likely to receive aid from a donor that was a colonial brother (relative a country 
with no colonial ties). However, only African countries receive more aid from their 
former colonial masters. This is interesting because it suggests that former colonial   25 
ties are much more important in African economies. This likely reflects the fact that 
African colonies more recently gained independence relative other former colonies.   
 
Table 5. The importance of Colonial ties. 
 
 
It is possible that colonial ties not only affect the level of food aid shipped 
from donor to recipient country, but also the responsiveness of aid to recipient 
needs. This would occur, for example, if colonial ties facilitated greater concern by 
the donor country for the recipient country or if ties resulted in better 
infrastructure that increase the flow of information regarding a production fall 
and/or the physical transportation of food aid in response to that fall. We test for 
such effects by returning to our examination of the responsiveness of food aid   26 
shipments to recipient production, but allowing for the relationship between donor 
shipments and recipient production shocks to differ  depending  on the colonial 
history of the pair. 
The results are reported in Table 6. To simplify  the exposition of the 
interpretation of the results,  we examine the average of the natural log of 
production in periods t-1 and t instead of production in periods t-2, t-1 and t. (The 
conclusions from the estimates are qualitatively identical if one considers 
production in the three periods separately.) We then interact domestic production 
with the two colonial indicator variables to allow differential responsiveness by 
colonial history. We also include both indicator variables directly in the estimating 
equation. 
The results show that for all recipient countries, aid is less responsive to local 
production shocks when it comes from colonial brothers. For African countries food 
aid shipments are less to recipient shocks from both former colonial masters and 
brothers. These results suggest that although former colonial ties result in more aid 
being given, that aid is not targeted to relieve the pressures from production shocks. 
   27 




The determinants and consequences of foreign aid have come under 
significant amounts of scrutiny and criticism in recent years. For example, the first 
three articles in the CATO Journal in 2009 were about the fallibility of aid. Food aid is 
central to foreign aid, as it is obviously meant for humanitarian purposes and has 
historically been the most important component of foreign aid. Its humanitarian 
intent is explicit. For example, U.S. president John F. Kenney named the U.S. food aid 
program is officially named Food For Peace. In this descriptive paper, we provide 
evidence consistent with the observations of concerned policy makers: food aid is 
partly determined by humanitarian purposes and partly determined by objectives   28 
that are unrelated to the needs of the recipient countries, such as colonial ties and 
other policy objectives of the donor countries.  
In addition, we show three striking new facts. First, food aid flows from the 
largest donors of food aid, such as the United States, are the least responsive to the 
production of recipients. Second, former colonial ties are an important determinant 
for food aid receipt, but this increased aid is less responsive to donor need. It does 
not appear successful at reaching those that need it most when they need it. In 
addition, the importance of colonial ties appears to be different for African and non-
African countries, reflecting perhaps the differences in time since independence of 
the two groups. All countries are more likely to get aid from their former colonial 
brothers. But only African countries are also more likely to get food aid from former 
colonial masters. Finally, aid due to former colonial ties is less responsive to food 
production falls in recipient countries than other aid, especially for African 
countries. 
These findings strongly support the recent concerns of policy makers and 
observers that food aid is not being allocated to fulfill its primary purpose, which is 
to alleviate hunger. They also open up several questions. For example, what roles do 
former colonial links play in development through contemporary channels? And 
perhaps more importantly, what are the barriers to more effective targeting of aid? 
Is it a lack of intent (or the presence of other objectives) for donor countries – i.e., is 
it political? Or are there other barriers such as the transmission of information,   29 
transport or effective delivery within the recipient countries? These are all 
important avenues for future research.   30 
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